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Animals are commonplace in genomic research, yet to date there has been little direct 
interrogation of the position, role and construction of animals in the otherwise 
flourishing social science of genomics. Following a brief discussion of this omission, 
I go on to suggest that there is much of interest for the social sciences and the 
humanities in this field of science. I show that animal genomics not only updates and 
extends established debates about the use of animals in science and society, but also 
raises novel issues and promotes new ways of thinking about what animals are, and 
the social and biological relationships between animals and humans. Organising the 
science of interest into six themes (sameness, difference and classification; crossing 
boundaries; the maintenance of borders; farmyard supermodels; laboratory 
supermodels; knowing, relating and looking at animals), for each I review some of the 
science that is being done, some of the conceptual issues that are raised, and some of 
the social science that is or could be done. I conclude by briefly considering the 




Animals are commonplace in genomic and biotechnological research, as principal 
objects of study or conduits and models for understanding human biology. This work 
connects with longstanding debates about the use of animals in science and society, 
extending and updating these with new techniques for understanding and using 
animals. But further, the science of genomics and the manipulation of animal 
genomes raises novel issues and promotes new ways of thinking about what animals 
are, how they evolve and relate to each other, and the social and biological 
relationships between animals and humans. Yet there is little direct interrogation of 
animal genomics in the social science literature, particularly if genomics is conceived 
only as the DNA sequencing of the entire genome. There is a growing literature for 
research agendas within the broader field of biotechnology, in particular 
xenotransplantation and genetically modified animals,2 and human-animal chimeras 
and cloning have also received some attention.3 But to date, the key arena for 
discussing developments like these remains ethics and bioethics.4 
 
Following a note on the meaning of “animal genomics”, this review briefly discusses 
the broad omission of animals from social science. The paper then goes on to consider 
the context and shaping of the science of animal genomics, a range of questions and 
issues for which genomic solutions have been proposed, and how this work might 
reconfigure the social and cultural position of animals and human-animal relations. 
Suggesting there is much here of social scientific interest, the paper finally considers 
policy issues for regulating and governing animal genomics and exploiting animal 
genomic research. 
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Animals, genomics and social science 
 
Although the term genomics might be restricted to the sequencing of the entire genetic 
complement of an organism, and so animal genomics might refer only to the genome 
sequencing of animals, in practice sequencing alone is of little interest. It is what 
follows that is significant, such as how that knowledge connects with what else is or 
can be known; how the knowledge so obtained might be applied; or how that animal 
is better understood in itself or in comparison to others. Sequencing may further be 
married with other techniques such as genetic modification or selective breeding, and 
the animal genome worked on and with in new or more intense and efficient ways. 
 
This marriage probably marks the disciplinary boundary of “animal genomics”. But 
for this paper I will conceive the field of interest more broadly still, for there are now 
practices where the genomes, genes and tissue of particular species turn up in novel 
and unexpected places, such as in xenotransplantation and stem cell research. For 
example, human embryonic stem cells have recently been implanted into, and have 
then integrated with, mice brains.5 The transplanted tissue is then a metonym for the 
animal or species from which it came, and the power of the connection is hard to 
erase, perhaps notably so if that animal’s genome has moved too. If animal genomics 
is thought of in these terms, broader than mere sequencing to encompass working on 
and with animal genomes, then as I go on to show and explain, the depth and 
significance of activities within animal genomics is extensive. 
 
This science uses and impacts on a lot of animals, including ourselves. Despite this, 
and with work reported in the present volume excepted, there is little direct work 
within social science on animal genomics as a topic in its own right. The work 
published so far has concentrated on certain hard cases – xenotransplantation, genetic 
modification, cloning – that have been opened up to public debate or seem 
particularly problematic in terms of ethics or regulation. Moreover, this research has 
usually been limited to what these practices might mean for people. For example, 
Michael argues that the ‘technoscientific bespoking’ of animals by making them 
‘ready-to-order … might catastrophically curtail the symbolic role of animals in 
human identities, and thus provoke a general anxiety toward new genetics’.6 What is 
happening to the animal is inconspicuous. 
 
This omission, perhaps, reflects a broader circumstance within social science, for 
animals remain in the social science literature largely invisible and ‘to read most 
sociological texts, one might never know that society is populated by non-human as 
well as human animals’.7 There is substantial work within other related disciplines 
such as moral philosophy8 and history,9 and some of this crosses with sociological 
accounts10 and has considered the impact of biotechnology.11 But, historical accounts 
aside, this work has generally been balanced toward an animal rights or ethical frame. 
Tester, for example, explores the way that society and individuals relate to animals, 
but his primary concern is with special claims made for animal rights.12 
 
Recently, some social scientists have attempted to account for animals’ invisibility, 
suggesting that animals tend to be embedded and treated within the broad category 
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“nature” or that social science is person-centred and animals, considered not part of 
society, are of little interest.13 Moreover, a social science of human-animal relations 
has recently expanded,14 and there is a large and developed literature on relations 
between humans and companion animals.15 But this attention has not yet transferred 
to the otherwise flourishing social science of genomics16 and the general lack of 
attention becomes all the more interesting given the integral position of animals in the 
genomics revolution (assuming there is such a revolution) and many other social and 
scientific practices.17 
 
Paula offers some of the clearest examples of published research with an explicitly 
animal-genomic orientation, considering the impact of genomic approaches in the 
context of food production and policy development.18 However, a broader research 
agenda that captures a wider range of genomic sciences and which considers the 
human, the animal, and the human-animal conceptual coupling is required, one which 
is unlikely to emerge simply from the aggregate of those individual projects currently 
represented in the literature. In the following section I outline six themes emerging 
from the science of animal genomics, broadly defined, of interest to social science 
(and to the arts and humanities). 
 
1. Sameness, difference and classification 
 
‘Much of nature’, comments Stephen Jay Gould, ‘is messy and multifarious, markedly 
resistant to simple mathematical expression’.19 But rather than being an obstruction to 
science, this amounts to its challenge, and genomics has become part of the scientific 
project that tries to turn nature, by which I mean here the plants, animals and other 
features and products of the earth, into something orderly and simple. Two particular 
and stubborn types of problem, presented by the mess and complexity of nature as 
well as by its size and spread, now have apparent genomic solutions and even 
mathematical articulation. The first concerns the recording and cataloguing of 
biodiversity, the second its classification. 
 
Species identification and recording biodiversity 
 
How does one determine of which known species a particular specimen is an 
example, or indeed if that specimen is “new to science”? Species identification is 
primarily based on visible morphology but the technique remains problematic. For 
example, Hebert et al point out that even the best taxonomists can identify just a tiny 
percentage of the estimated 10-15 million species on Earth, and morphological keys 
used in identification require such a high level of expertise that misdiagnoses are 
common. Further, variation between individual members of a species can lead to 
misidentification, and morphology can differ significantly across the life-span making 
correct identification difficult. Some species are morphologically cryptic, that is, so 
similar that it is nearly impossible to distinguish between them, and even if other 
factors like internal anatomy, behaviour and geography can be taken into 
consideration, Hebert et al note that ‘although much biological research depends on 
species diagnosis, taxonomic expertise is collapsing’.20 To resolve the problem, they 
propose that short DNA sequences known as “barcodes” offer the best approach to a 
sustainable identification system. 
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DNA barcoding assumes that a simple and unique DNA sequence can distinguish and 
therefore identify any given species, and the search is underway for a sufficiently 
standardised yet discriminatory section of DNA. Early attempts resulted in some 
failures, classifying ladybird beetles as wasps, for example,21 but a 648 base pair 
region of the cytochrome c oxidase I (COI) mitochondrial gene has been shown to be 
particularly promising in tests with birds, fishes and some orders of insects.22 
 
Barcoding every species would help field scientists identify specimens, but social 
scientists might note that the technique has social and policy implications. For 
example, barcoding may facilitate the monitoring of species, feeding into current 
societal and policy concerns over conservation, the maintenance of biodiversity and 
the tracing of foodstuffs (on the latter, see section 3 below). For example, a group 
attempting to barcode all fish argue that such data would assist sustained fisheries 
management and consumer confidence.23 
 
But the promissory future for barcoding transcends identification and monitoring, and 
the vision is for nothing short of a barcoded world. There is now a strong and 
developing research network – the Consortium for the Barcode of Life24 – and reports 
suggest that a Canadian team will have barcoded every known bird in the world by 
2010.25 Once a comprehensive species catalogue has been compiled, it could then be 
made instantly accessible. Paul Hebert, barcoding’s chief protagonist, envisions a day 
‘when every curious mind, from professional biologists to schoolchildren, will have 
easy access to the names and biological attributes of any species on the planet’.26 This 
will have implications for public understanding and engagement with science, and 
sociologists of science may also note that barcoding has generated debate within 
scientific circles on its economic and technical footing as well as its consequences for 
traditional taxonomy and taxonomists.27 There is presently no social scientific interest 
in this fascinating and growing field, but if realised, the claims of the barcoding 
community will be socially, politically and conceptually significant.28 
 
Species and classification 
 
For Will et al, ‘DNA barcoding has both new and good elements, but unfortunately no 
elements that are both’.29 Ebach and Holrege are similarly dismissive, arguing that 
barcoding generates only information not knowledge, and tells us little more than we 
know already: ‘life is complex’.30 In particular, whilst barcoding may lend itself to 
identification under conditions of uncertainty, it has less application to some other 
goals of taxonomy such as classifying organisms and describing relations between 
them. Classifying and relating are particularly hard problems, but where the limits of 
barcoding are reached, other genome-based solutions are encountered. 
 
Ritvo notes a persistent paradox: it is obvious that human beings are different from 
non-human animals but it is not obvious what the kind and degree of difference is.31 
This problem of determining sameness and difference extends to all other relations 
between members of the animal kingdom, and Ritvo records some of the many ways 
that, historically, these differences have been discussed and turned into systems of 
classification.32 As a systematised scientific endeavour, classification – the practical 
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activity of assigning the vast numbers of organisms in the world to particular kinds – 
can trace its roots to the enlightenment and has turned up many competing schemes. 
But that there have been (and are) competing schemes and taxonomies supports 
Ritvo’s general point that classification, and description of sameness and difference, 
reflects intellectual, social and political commitments as much as, or more than, what 
differences there “really” are. 
 
For some, any difficulty in a satisfactory final classification scheme of all animals 
should be circumvented (and explained) by considering classification as a pragmatic 
and pluralist practice. Dupré argues that diverse sets of people – biologists, ecologists, 
foresters, gamekeepers, wildflower enthusiasts, members of the public and so on – 
require workable classifications, but classifications that need not necessarily align.33 
No particular scheme should be privileged, and Dupré argues that ordinary-language 
or folk taxonomies can be treated on a par with, and in the same way as, scientific 
classifications. For example, Dupré suggests there is no sound reason to exclude 
whales from the category fish, except the consensual agreement that they are not. 
Prior to science, whales were fish but folk were ‘duped into changing that belief for 
bad reasons’.34 
 
Dupré acknowledges that this claim is controversial, but to say that there is no unique 
and privileged biological (ie, within science) classification is less so. An underlying 
difficulty (but one that does not trouble barcoders) is that there is no current solution 
to the ‘famously difficult’ species problem; that is, the failure of biologists to agree on 
how we should define the word “species” and therefore the grounds on which we 
should make species discriminations.35 A popular solution is to consider two 
populations of sexually reproducing organisms as different species if they cannot 
interbreed with each other. But this only accounts for sexually reproducing organisms, 
of which many living organisms including many plants are not, so a different concept 
is needed for them. Also, as Hey points out, some breeds of dog can mate but some 
cannot (because of extreme size differences) leaving it open whether ‘dog’ is a term 
for many different or one species. These, and other problems, mean that there are 
some two dozen different definitions of “species”.36 
 
For Hey, much of the difficulty comes in the deployment of rival and fuzzy linguistic 
categories, all of which are assumed to mirror patterns found in nature. But into this 
uncertain arena, genome sequencing might offer empirical, clarifying data. 
Comparing DNA sequences and whole genomes offers the promise of an objective 
concept for the relationship between organisms,37 yet as I will show, it might be just 
as troubling. 
 
Humans and other animals 
 
Although there are certainly groups and individuals who would say otherwise, in 
scientific and much popular parlance humans are animals, even if we might think that 
humans are particularly distinctive animals. This view is maintained in the current 
consensual scheme of biological classification and through the theory of evolution. 
But as already indicated, whilst it is easy to say humans are particularly distinctive 
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animals, this is the start of many conceptual and empirical difficulties. From a 
conceptual perspective, Herrnstein Smith writes: 
 
‘Once the straightforward truth of our human distinctiveness is 
unsettled by the straightforward truth of our animal identity, there is 
no point, or at least no more obviously natural point, beyond which 
the claims of our kinship with other creatures – or, indeed, beings of 
any kind – could not be extended; nor, by the same token, is there 
any grouping of creatures, at least no more obviously rational 
grouping, to which such claims might not be confined’.38 
 
For Herrnstein Smith, this invokes a ‘chain of animate being’, a continuum that can’t 
sensibly be broken up into discrete units toward which different rules of conduct 
apply. But people frequently act as if it can. Herrnstein Smith refers, for example, to 
an ‘ethical taxonomy’ where our sensed and practised responsibilities to horses, 
butterflies, walruses, oysters, wasps, lice and microbes are quite different. 
 
Extending our moral responsibility to microbes seems absurd, but Herrnstein Smith’s 
point is that there is no obvious point on the continuum to make the break and divide 
the sensible from the silly. This is a policy as well as a philosophical conundrum, and 
one discussed in the UK Parliament during a debate on the proposed animal welfare 
bill. One Member of Parliament noted considerable problems with the definition of 
“animal” in the bill. For the purposes of the bill, the category “animal” contains only 
vertebrates, but the Member argued that if the bill was designed to alleviate the 
suffering of animals, then it should be extended to those non-vertebrates that scientific 
evidence suggests are capable of suffering, including cephalopods such as octopus 
and cuttlefish.39 Perhaps then the scientific criteria of “suffering” should replace the 
scientific category of “vertebrate”. 
 
Genome analysis cannot speak directly to such ethical and political questions, but it 
does have something empirical to say about degrees of difference and relatedness 
between organisms; a quantitative knife so to speak. One of the less celebrated 
findings of the human genome project is how few genes humans have. Early estimates 
suggested up to 200,000 with a concomitant theory that the more complex an 
organism the more genes it would have (and obviously we would have the most). But 
this number has steadily dropped to the current estimate of about 25,000, making 
humans around 3,000 genes different to a worm, 2,000 different to a fruit fly, and 
17,000 different to rice, which has more.40 This fall required some re-working of the 
notion of complexity: if humans were to remain the most complex, mere numbers of 
genes could not be the key. Attention shifted from structure to function and meaning. 
For example, Enard et al report that human and chimp genomes are 98.7% identical in 
their DNA sequence, yet there are many clear differences between the species.41 
Hypothesising that the underlying basis of these differences is likely to be altered 
gene expression, they go on to show that large numbers of quantitative changes in 
gene expression can be detected between closely related mammals. Such changes, 
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Human complexity is thus saved, but 98.7% still seems to suggest that humans and 
chimps are mostly the same, a figure that rises to 99.4% for functionally important 
sites. ‘Chimps are human, gene study implies’ read the headline on NewScientist.com 
when the latter figure 99.4% was announced,43 and for Morris Goodman and 
colleagues data like this challenges the anthropological view that has traditionally 
emphasised how very different humans are from all other forms of life.44 For 
Goodman et al, whilst traditionally chimps are classified with gorillas and orang-utans 
in the family pongidae, separate from the human family hominidae, the DNA data 
means that chimps must be moved over to the human family: ‘The accumulating DNA 
evidence provides an objective non-anthropocentric view of the place of humans in 
evolution. We humans appear as only slightly remodelled chimpanzee-like apes’.45 
That doesn’t make us sound particularly special or even distinctive, and Goodman 
claims anthropologists have their own vested interests for making us seem 
otherwise.46 
 
But what does it mean, based on DNA data, to say that ‘chimps are human’? 
Anthropologist Jonathan Marks argues that similarity in DNA is being casually 
translated into similarity of “us”, but this is just metonymy – replacing one part of us 
for “us”. Moreover, why describe us as a remodelled chimp-like ape? As Marks points 
out, this is just because we interpret a figure like 98.7% identity in DNA to mean we 
are 98.7% chimp, but on that basis we are also 35% daffodil, and to say we’re quite 
extensively remodelled daffodils ‘is more ludicrous than profound’.47 
 
For Marks, to read anything into this is to reduce life to genetics, and genetics has 
nothing important to say about the differences between humans and animals. A figure 
like 98.7% or 99.4% ‘bears the precision of modern technology [and] carries the air of 
philosophical relevance’ but this emperor really has no clothes.48 Marks takes to 
pieces the methodologies of comparative genomics and shows how assumptions stack 
up to error. He then claims that anyway, there is nothing profound about saying that 
we are genetically similar yet different to chimps: this is entailed by the theory of 
evolution. Moreover, there are so many ways that humans are so obviously different 
to other animals, including the chimpanzee, that what needs explaining is why we are 
currently bewitched by genetic similarity. 
 
There is no space here to look deeper into the ongoing debate on the significance of 
DNA comparisons between humans and other animals, save to raise three of many 
points of interest for the social sciences and humanities. The first is conceptual, for 
the debate amounts to a struggle for the right to define humanness. Since the 1960s, 
old questions pertaining to describing and conceptualising the similarities and 
differences between humans and other animals have begun to be colonised by 
genome-based sciences and the implications of this for understanding humanness 
need to be fully worked out. The second and third points, not unrelated, are 
sociological. 
 
This struggle is as much conceptual as it is territorial, with traditional anthropology, 
molecular anthropology, molecular biology and comparative genomics amongst those 
disciplines claiming the right to define what amounts to humanness. This struggle will 
be of interest to sociologists of science and different techniques, materials and forms 
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of evidence (palaeontology, genomics, ethnography, bones, DNA and so on) are 
mobilised by different groups in support of one position or another. But, as suggested, 
molecular techniques appear to be emerging as markers of the dominant paradigm, 
and so the third and final question asks why. 
 
With Marks, the colonisation of humanness by genome science might most simply be 
viewed as an extensively generalised example of the narrative of geneticisation, a 
term first used by Lippman to refer, in the context of health and disease, to ‘an 
ongoing process by which differences between individuals are reduced to their DNA 
codes’.49 When applied to an understanding of the demarcations between humans and 
animals, this certainly sounds like what we are talking about. To illustrate, Armand 
Leroi, a biologist at Imperial College London, explained in a documentary on UK 
television that we can cast aside all other previously mooted demarcation criteria and 
simply point to particular genes: 
 
‘Ever since Aristotle, philosophers have wondered what makes us 
different from the beasts. Their answers – that man is a political 
animal, a thinking animal, a tool making animal – can now be 
discarded. Now, when we ask what makes us human, we can answer 
this gene, and that one and that one. We can begin to write the 
recipe for making a human being’.50 
 
Accordingly, a research effort is underway to pinpoint the telltale genes.51 But to say 
we now view such differences as genetic because we see everything as genetic is not 
saying much, and to understand the hold and power of DNA in this case we need to 
look at something else. 
 
The essence of DNA, no matter how it can be described in biochemical terms, is that 
it is information.52 The drift to information began in 1965 when Zuckerkandl and 
Pauling stated that the essence of the organism is located in informational 
macromolecules, particularly DNA.53 For them, the only reason we see discrete living 
forms at all is because of the relatively fixed information passed from generation to 
generation, information contained in DNA. This encourages a particular view of 
humanness, an ontological shift perhaps, but Zuckerkandl and Pauling would and 
probably could not have predicted the transformations in information technology that 
would come in the following decades, and which would bring DNA to the foreground. 
 
An impressive international effort devoted to the sequencing and digital storage of 
animal genomes now relies on information technology. Many outputs are made 
available on publicly accessible databases, and the DNA codes of African savannah 
elephant, the nine-banded armadillo, the domestic cat, the European rabbit and the 
northern white-cheeked gibbon were just a few of those to begin to be sequenced in 
2006.54 Tentatively then, the particular attraction of DNA for conceptualising 
humanness and relations between animals might be that DNA presents, indeed is, a 
code that can be read, collated, stored, sorted, compared, manipulated, categorised and 
accessed in a way not offered by other sources of data. Of all the possible types of 
data that have or could be used as demarcation criteria between animals – bone, hair, 
communication, tool use, art, culture, consciousness, reflection, whatever – it is DNA 
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that has been selected and harvested, and through the interconnection with 
information systems, humanness and the essence of animals is quantified and 
digitized. 
 
The sheer volume of information generated presents significant practical problems: 
genomes sequenced to date range in size from 100 to a thousand million bytes and just 
storing genomic information and the results of comparisons is a challenge.55 Yet the 
effort is considered worthwhile, not just because cross-species genome comparisons 
offer a tool for understanding the genetic factors involved in human health and illness, 
but that they also offer the chance to complete the annotation of the “tree of life”. 
 
The tree (or ring or net) of life 
 
Phylogenetic trees are schemes that represent evolutionary relationships between 
organisms, and molecular phylogenetics infers these relationships through comparing 
DNA sequences. Molecular phylogenetics expanded with DNA sequencing 
techniques and more so in the 1990s with the rapid sequencing and availability of 
whole animal genomes. Two basic assumptions are that all species, present and past, 
share a single common ancestor, and that as time passes new species evolve from 
earlier ones. If genomes evolve by the gradual accumulation of mutations, then the 
amount of difference in nucleotide sequence between two genomes indicates how 
recently those genomes shared a particular common ancestor, with two recently 
diverged genomes having fewer differences than two that diverged further back in 
time.56 By comparing three or more genomes, the evolutionary relationship between 
them can be inferred, and in principle, if you carried on doing this for everything it 
would be possible to construct the universal tree, ‘an image that unifies all life 
through its shared histories and common origin’.57 
 
But at the same time as showing promise for completing the universal tree, genomics 
might ultimately undermine this goal. First, different research objectives, 
methodologies and practices produce different trees, meaning that the (re)construction 
of evolutionary time, events and relationships remains indeterminate. Second, 
genomic research suggests that at its very deepest roots, the tree metaphor has to give 
way to a ring or a net. Darwin made his first (but not the first) sketch of something 
like an evolutionary tree in his 1837 Notebook on Transmutation of Species, and 
“tree” is the standard metaphor for evolutionary relationships.58 But comparative 
genomics and the subsequent demonstration of horizontal gene transfer (the 
transmission of DNA between species) suggest that the “tree of life” depiction of 
evolution is misleading, or perhaps even meaningless.59 Research by Rivera and Lake 
suggests that the relatively complex genome of eukaryotes (cellular non-bacterial life) 
arose from the fusion of two simple prokaryote genomes. This, they argue, means that 
at the deepest levels there is a ring of life with no start and no end.60 Alternatively, 
Kunin et al and Doolittle prefer to talk of a net of life.61 Trees only represent linear 
and vertical relationships, but the net metaphor better captures the transmission of 
DNA between organisms. 
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The increase in resolution afforded by genome analysis therefore challenges orderly, 
tree-like representations and confirms that nature is messy all along. Doolittle 
summarises the general situation like this: 
 
‘Biologists came to think that … the ultimate natural order is a 
single inclusively hierarchical, “universal phylogenetic tree”, 
without reticulation … If, however, different genes give different 
trees, and there is no fair way to suppress this disagreement, then a 
species (or phylum) can “belong” to many genera (of kingdoms) at 
the same time: There really can be no universal phylogenetic tree of 
organisms based on such a reduction to genes’.62 
 
Doolittle suggests that to save the tree concept, organisms could be defined as more 
than the sum of their genes, having some sort of ‘emergent reality’ which permits 
once more expression of relationships to be maintained at the species/organismal 
level. But if we need to turn to extra criteria, the increasingly technical and 
quantitative investigation of the relationships between animals from molecular 
phylogenetics and comparative genomics has brought us no closer to conceptually 
defining borders between organisms. There is no better demonstration of these 
emergent realities than when ordinary language classifications, expressed through 
sensed kinship, are revealed in genomic breaching experiments; that is, scientific 
practices where borders are transgressed. 
 
2. Crossing boundaries 
 
Robert and Baylis list seven examples of ‘novel creatures’, real or imagined, which 
mix biological material across conventional species boundaries, be they animal-to-
animal transgenic organisms or nuclear-cytoplasmic hybrids, or human-animal 
chimeras created by inserting human cellular material into a nonhuman embryo or 
nonhuman material inserted into adult humans.63 What happens when scientists mix 
tissue from different species into a new whole? Perhaps moral and ethical confusion, 
queasiness, revulsion, affront to nature, a challenge to humanness and animal 
integrity?64 Perhaps all of these, but perhaps also the betterment of human and animal 
health, improved animal welfare, or better animal products.65 
 
For Cohen, recent technologies that enable the insertion of human cells into animals 
and vice-versa require the development of a standard for determining where the 
conceptual boundary between humans and animals lies, and when it has been 
crossed.66 But as we have seen, conceptually delineating that boundary is a difficult 
matter. An alternative approach might be to turn the study of boundaries from a 
conceptual issue to an empirical one. Franklin argues that the site for rehearsing 
boundaries and transgressions is sociological, and that the process has in some senses 
begun.67 For example, research on cultural constructions of new reproductive and 
genetic technologies like IVF and preimplantation diagnosis might offer an analogue 
for discussion about human-animal chimeras. Franklin notes that anthropological 
research has shown notions such as relationality, kinship, affinity and inheritance are 
frames of reference within which people work through the desire both to and not to 
limit genetic technologies. It might be reasonable to guess that these concepts might 
also frame reactions to genetic technologies that cross animal boundaries, particularly 
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if it is easier to demonstrate essential continuity between animals and humans than to 
define difference. Franklin concludes that it is necessary to understand and explicate 
the sociological principles through which our ‘genomic future’ is being shaped, 
allowing us to predict and rehearse when technologies like those that make animal-
human chimeras are most likely to become problematic. 
 
Experience already tells us that ethical or other arguments against such technologies 
are challenged by the chance that they might save someone’s life, and otherwise 
“repugnant” technologies become acceptable or even imperative. Bailey for example 
urges the use of infant baboons as heart donors for infant humans. Bailey performed 
such an operation in 1984, the human infant Baby Fae living for 20 days before the 
heart was rejected. For Bailey, the argument for such a procedure is clear: 
 
‘baboons are a plentiful, unthreatened, largely homologous, 
versatile donor resource that should be further investigated for this 
purpose. They are utilized widely in laboratory research … 
Immature baboons should not be dismissed as potential donors for 
young infants unless, or until, they are proved through laboratory or 
clinical research to transfer infections’.68 
 
That baboons are numerous and already subjects of scientific procedures are not 
reasons for their exploitation as organ donors, yet all the same it is not straightforward 
to argue against the saving of an infant’s life, even if a baboon’s is lost. But Franklin’s 
point is that we should seek to explore these ethical and moral conundrums before we 
face stark imperatives, before we even know, for example, if it is technically possible 
to create hybrid embryos by fusing human cells with rabbit eggs, a proposal widely 
discussed in the press.69 Some of the necessary sociological work will be to look at 
the positioning and construction of scientific research that crosses given species 
boundaries by those proposing to do it, those who challenge it, those who regulate it, 
and those who might have to live with the consequences of it. In this vein, several 
studies have begun to investigate lay and expert practical reasoning around 
technologies that transgress species barriers. 
 
Although Bailey recommends the baboon as donor, scientific research and the weight 
of consensus focuses on the pig. Brown and Michael investigated the criteria used by 
scientists to legitimate this selection, and the way that they defended their work 
against negative representations.70 They found that scientists drew asymmetrically on 
the resources of sameness and difference when justifying using pigs rather than the 
more immediately obvious nonhuman primates. For example, the scientists 
emphasised that culturally and ethically, pigs are different to humans in a way that 
other primates are not, and so pigs can be categorised differently, ethically speaking. 
But technically speaking, they stressed that pigs are the better candidate because they 
are more similar; for example their organs are of more similar size throughout the 
lifespan than are those of primates. Brown and Michael show how scientists moved 




© ESRC Genomics Network.
            Genomics, Society and Policy 




Genomics, Society and Policy, Vol.3, No.2 (2007) ISSN: 1746-5354 
12
An underlying assumption of social science research of this type is that declarations of 
sameness and difference are rhetorical achievements, not “natural” categories: they 
are contingent, tied to the historical moment or an actor’s social location and could 
therefore be otherwise. The political (and policy) edge to this work is that if this is the 
case, then on what grounds can any one account be privileged? Brown and Michael 
suggest that experts qua experts assume the facticity of their accounts and present 
their knowledge as wholly unproblematic to public groups. But public groups are not 
straightforwardly receptive. In a later work, Michael and Brown analyse 
conversations between lay people discussing xenotransplantation.71 Noting that much 
expert assessment of technologies is couched in terms of cost-benefit analysis (Bailey 
above compares the benefit of transplant to the cost of zoonoses) they show that for 
lay people, cost-benefit is a highly contingent concept. For example, participants 
reasoned that they needed to trust experts providing information on which any cost-
benefit analysis could be made, and moreover, needed to make a discriminatory 
judgement regarding whose costs and benefits to believe. 
 
This asymmetry between expert and lay assessment can have significant 
consequences for the future trajectory of a given technology, and the science 
community is not unaware that mixed-species embryos might provoke public 
disquiet.72 Grove-White et al argue that that the late 1990s’ public backlash against 
GM crops developed from areas of tension between the public on the one hand, and 
industry, Government and “sound science” on the other.73 Now research by 
Macnaghten suggests similar tensions for GM animals. 74 Macnaghten observed 
public mistrust toward those institutions seen as responsible for such work combining 
with a view that GM animals are not ‘natural’ and that our ‘moral’ responsibility 
toward animals is being breached. Macnaghten warns that for GM animals, public 
controversy is likely. 
 
If something positive came out of the intense and often acrimonious public debate on 
GM crops and foods in the UK, it is that it catalysed the current interest in upstream 
public engagement in science policy,75 and for animal genomics there is some 
prospect for the development of new participatory modes of regulatory development. 
For example, the regulatory status of different human-animal chimeras is not yet 
wholly fixed and the human-rabbit experiments mentioned above exposed a 
regulatory grey area centred on whether the resulting embryos could or would be 
considered “human”. The situation is complex too for human-mice chimeras, and the 
legal and regulatory landscape is as unclear as the moral and the ethical.76 Yet this 
lack of clarity could be turned into an opportunity for the creation of a socially robust 
policy and regulatory agenda. This will require “social intelligence” on public and 
expert opinion, and so becomes an opportunity for social science. 
 
3. The maintenance of borders: genomics, traceability and surveillance 
 
Haraway locates the “problem” of transgenic organisms in a challenge to the ‘sanctity 
of life’ maintained in Western cultures, which historically have been obsessed with 
racial purity, categories authorised by nature and the well-defined self.77 Whilst this 
diagnosis sensitises us to the contingency of common unease at GM animals, it does 
not remove the sociological fact that by showing how permeable they are, these 
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technologies problematise received borders between species and between individuals. 
In contrast, other genomic technologies are concerned not with crossing borders, but 
with maintaining and policing them. 
 
The movement of animals and animal products within and across nations presents 
significant challenges for control. Mitchell et al report that within Britain alone, there 
are around 19 million farm-to-farm cattle movements annually.78 In the search for 
improved tools for tracing movements, genomics can now be applied to the 
identification of individual farm animals, herds or animal products. For example, 
DNA sequence variation between individual animals, the principle behind the 
barcoding approach discussed above, allows the traceability and certification of 
animal products at any point from farmyard to consumption, to verify the quality and 
the breed origin of meat or to verify pedigree.79 Several companies now offer these 
services, such as Pyxis Genomics in the United States and the Irish company 
IdentiGEN, whose ‘TraceBack’ system uses DNA profiles to track meat back to the 
individual animal of origin, guaranteeing 100% traceability.80 In one particular case, 
Sygen developed DNA tracing technology to verify meat from a rare English pig. 
Meat from Berkshire pigs sells for up to three times more than other pork in Japan, 
but more pork claiming to be Berkshire was on the market than animals available to 
supply it. The DNA test exploits variation involved in colour and other physical 
characteristics between Berkshire and other pigs.81 
 
A particularly urgent utility for DNA fingerprinting technology lies with the 
traceability and containment of disease. “Biosecurity” (the attempt to ensure the 
health of animals, humans, ecologies etc.) in the form of “surveillance” arrived on the 
farmyard in the wake of the UK foot and mouth disease epidemic in 200182 and 
surveillant genomic technologies are now being presented as solutions to biosecurity 
issues. For example, within the EU, high value is placed on accurate and secure 
animal identification for the monitoring and eradication of disease, but Cunningham 
and Meghen argue that current technologies, based largely on ear tagging and national 
databases, are flawed.83 They point out that tag switching can disguise a diseased 
animal for sale, or identify a healthy animal as diseased for compensation. Animal 
theft and smuggling also challenge conventional tracing procedures. They conclude 
that DNA technology offers a powerful means of authenticating and controlling 
animal identification. 
 
The application of genomics to matters of surveillance and control is clearly a policy 
issue, but currently there is little social scientific input or research. The design and 
implementation of policy requires a complex set of processes as well as processors, 
and social scientists can usefully “get amongst” these to facilitate successful policy 
implementation and to investigate intended and unintended social and economic 
consequences. For example, from an industry perspective, the need for genomic based 
technologies is sometimes framed as a means to restore consumer confidence in meat 
foodstuffs.84 But I have already noted that trust is a sufficiently complex sociological 
phenomenon that, if there is a lack of confidence in meat production, mere technical 
solutions may not be adequate for its restoration. 
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There is also an opportunity for more theoretical and conceptual social scientific work 
concerning the ordering and re-ordering of social relations, the control of space and 
movement, and the translation of animal bodies into information and data. Some 
grounds for this can be found in Donaldson and Wood who show the social dimension 
of disease management through a case study of foot and mouth disease.85 The authors 
point out that disease control and surveillance strategies are rooted in economic and 
political systems more than the material nature of the disease. They argue that 
surveillance manifests as a mode of ordering that controls space and movement 
through the construction of bounded categories, and that the primary unit of control is 
not bodies (animal or human) but information and activity. 
 
Consider for example the UK National Scrapie Plan (NSP).86 This involves a series of 
breeding strategies intended to increase the number of sheep genetically resistant to 
scrapie, and the hope is that eventually the disease will be eradicated from the national 
sheep flock. Genomics has been recruited into this scheme as a tool of categorisation. 
Surveillance, Donaldson and Wood note, depends on the purity of categories and the 
cleanest possible demarcations between them. Genomics, in the form of genotyping, 
is used in the NSP to determine a sheep’s resistance or susceptibility to scrapie, 
generating clear demarcations between desirable and undesirable genotypes. These 
distinctions are captured in tables and diagrams where sheep are translated into one of 
15 possible genotypes. For instance, the ‘NSP Ram Genotyping Scheme 
Consequences Table’ for purebred rams displays 15 genotypes ordered into 5 
‘types’.87 For a genotyped ram falling into types 1-3, no restrictions apply and that 
ram can be placed on the Ram Register, a facility to aid the sale or loan of resistant 
rams. But if a ram turns out to be type 4 or 5, then an immediate restriction is placed 
on the sale, transfer or breeding of that animal and it must be slaughtered or castrated 
within 90 days. 
 
Although the disappearance of type 4 and 5 rams from the gene pool will be 
considered economically advantageous, the consequences for each ram of the 
translation of its corporeality to data and back by and through a network of actors and 
centres of calculation can be fatal.88 Yet this represents more than a disregard for that 
animal. The NSP shows how genomics can facilitate the translation of animal bodies 
into information and, by making them simply data stored at centralised locations 
remote from that animal or traditional agents of control (eg, farms and farmers), the 
instrumental or mechanistic representation of animals is complete. This representation 
is clearly seen in the industrial application of animal genomics on the farmyard. 
 
4. Farmyard supermodels 
 
In his article A Short, Meat-Oriented History of the World, Cockburn notes that the 
meat industry is Cartesian in outlook and considers animals merely machinery.89 He 
quotes an executive from a meat company saying that sows should be thought of, and 
treated as, valuable machines whose function is to pump out baby pigs like sausages. 
This casting of animals in instrumental and mechanistic terms fits seamlessly with the 
language and practice of farm animal genomics. 
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Genomics, in the form of genome analysis, marker assisted selection and genetic 
modification, offers an opportunity to intensify the industrial productivity of animals. 
Raadsma and Tammen neatly encapsulate this materialist objective when they note 
that genomic technologies will (social factors permitting) lead to the development of 
‘novel and high value products’ and ‘opportunities for the mass production of elite 
males for use in extensive animal production systems’.90 
 
For example, the identification of genes associated with particular traits enables 
informed selection and breeding strategies and/or genetic modification to create 
animals with new or improved characteristics, or to remove undesirable traits. To 
illustrate, pork contributes 43% of the worlds consumed red meat and research at the 
genomic level attempts to identify candidate genes for efficient growth rates, 
reproduction, litter size, disease susceptibility, carcass merit (eg, intramuscular fat) 
and meat quality (eg, tenderness, colour). Using marker-assisted selection, this 
information is being used within the pig industry to improve pig production.91 A 
recent World Health Organisation report outlines many other examples in production 
or planning, including transgenic salmon that grow 3-5 times faster than their non-
transgenic counterparts, cows that produce protein-rich milk to increase the efficiency 
of cheese production, and chickens with two active ovaries for increased egg 
production.92 
 
These “farmyard supermodels” are something of an achievement for farm animal 
genomics. The phrase “farmyard supermodels” came from an aside made by a 
presenter at an international farm animal genomics conference. Following 
presentations on progress in chicken and bovine genomics, this presenter showed that 
pig scientists too had their own ‘supermodels’ with a picture of a sow suckling a 
particularly large number of piglets. In terms of ‘farm level performance’ and the 
production of progeny this sow was exceptional, and throughout the conference many 
other examples of high performers – pigs with minimal back fat, chickens with extra 
strong legs to hold extra large bodies, cows with exceptional ‘carcass merit’ and so on 
– were displayed. 
 
The continuity between modern breeding informed by genomics and ancient animal 
breeding is often stressed.93 But it was with the rise of market economies, when 
animal products become commodities, that selection started to focus on 
productivity,94 and it is likely that, informed by the knowledge of the action of 
thousand of genes,95 industrial interest and the weight of private finance will focus on 
production traits. Yet farm animal genomics is not concerned only with such traits. 
The centrally funded UK Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council 
lists product quality and efficiency as only one of three applications of farm animal 
genomics alongside farm animal health and welfare, and human health.96 
 
For the latter, the BBSRC and Roberts argue that farm animals offer particular 
advantages over the more typical mouse for understanding fundamental biology and 
for furthering biomedical research (although see section 5 below).97 More directly, 
over twenty companies worldwide are involved in the production and harvesting of 
therapeutic proteins from transgenic animal “bioreactors” in a process known as 
pharming.98 In June 2006, the European Medicines Agency announced approval of 
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the first drug produced in an animal bioreactor.99 GTC Biotherapeutics' ATryn is an 
anti-clotting agent for use in people who lack the natural anticoagulant protein an
harvested from transgenic goats. As in this case, proteins are usually gathered from 






In terms of animal health and welfare, research can involve identifying at the genome 
level disease susceptibility or resistance (such as in the NSP),101 but genomics also 
targets less obvious concerns. Researchers at the Roslin Institute have used genome 
analysis to investigate genetic variation in nitrogen and phosphorous excretion by 
poultry, and the feasibility of reducing this by genetic selection. This would address 
terrestrial and aquatic pollution as well as improve the environment for poultry, farm 
personnel and nearby residents.102 Genetic selection or modification is also being 
used to select against behaviour that contributes to welfare problems, and genomics 
holds promise for “improving” welfare by, for instance, enabling animals to better 
“tolerate” unfavourable conditions, or removing behaviours that lead to distress or 
increased rates of mortality. For example, piglet mortality is a major welfare and 
economic problem in the pig industry. Around 12% of deaths are the consequence of
crushing by the sow, and some sows crush more piglets than others. Observi
differences could be used to support a culling regime, or if differences between sows 
could be shown to have a genetic component, a selective breeding programme. This 
could involve genomic research, identifying and selecting specific genotypes.103 
 
This work is indicative of an increased attention to animal welfare and a considerable 
body of European and UK legislation, together with popular concern and action 
toward welfare (eg. growing demand for free range animal products, demonstrations 
against farm animal transportation) suggests the growth of an ‘animal welfare 
consciousness’.104 Whilst this consciousness might be threatened by any increase in 
animal research or intensification of agriculture flowing from genomic research, 
genomics can, like for the pigs and chickens, address welfare problems. There are 
however at least two reasons to suggest that, again, mere technical solutions may be 
unsatisfactory. 
 
First, it is a utilitarian or cruel-to-be-kind welfare solution that eliminates or 
slaughters some animals so that “better” ones may survive. Roberts points out that 
flowing from animal genomics will be ‘no major effort to coax a genetically infertile 
sow to reproduce, for example. Flocks and herds will likely be screened for 
undesirable alleles and affected animals culled from the population’.105 This is a 
human- not animal-centred mode of ordering, a mode organised on economic 
principles legitimised by appeal to moral concern. This connects to the second reason. 
Buller and Morris argue that the gradual pervasiveness of animal welfare policy and 
regulation legitimates the continued subjugation of animals founded in modernity: 
 
‘Farm animals, those ‘docile bodies’, have become vehicles for 
capitalist accumulation through processes of selection, breeding, 
intensive husbandry and now genetic modification’.106 
 
In the face of this ‘modernism re-embedded’, Buller and Morris urge two things: the 
recognition of animals as sentient beings with ‘individual animalian distinctiveness’; 
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and a new and more individualistic approach to welfare and farming that takes 
account of the affective and interactive relations between humans and non-humans. 
The first proposition argues for the reorientation of relations toward the horizontal 
over the hierarchical, whilst the second suggests that on-farm as well as other 
relations are psychological and social first, technical second. As Tisdell, and Schakel 
and van Broekhuizen show, breeding is not merely a technical matter, but a socio-
economic and cultural one, too,107 and this, perhaps surprisingly, holds for the 
laboratory animal. 
 
5. Laboratory supermodels 
 
Some of the hardest working and most numerous animal supermodels are in 
laboratories. According to a report in Nature, animal research facilities are 
overflowing with ‘mutant mice’ and face a multi-million dollar logistical nightmare. 
For this, ‘overworked animal technicians can blame genomics’.108 The mouse genome 
was completed in draft in 2002 and excitement within the science community has 
been as difficult to contain as the mice.109 Garanga describes the completion as a 
‘watershed that forces us to re-consider our conceptual tools and the way we do 
research’, and Gunter and Dhand suggest that for many, the mouse genome ‘holds 
more promise for our future than even the human genome itself’.110 This is because 
the mouse is the experimental model for human biology, and in 2003 mice were 
involved in around 65% of all animal experiments in the UK.111 The completion of 
the mouse genome reinforces and extends this distinguished position: 
 
‘there can scarcely be a major area of mammalian biology or 
medicine to which mouse studies have not contributed in some way, 
often as surrogates for human studies … Much of this power has 
come from technologies to manipulate the mouse genome, but until 
now we have in effect been shooting in the dark. The genome of Mus 
musculus will provide the necessary illumination’.112 
 
The study of genetic disease using mice can be based on natural variants, natural 
mutants, chemical- or radiation-induced mutants, or engineered mutants, and can be 
used to understand the role of specific genes in monogenic and multifactorial diseases 
such as type 2 diabetes and sensorineural deafness.113 Particular interest is focused on 
the utility of “knockout” mice, and a project recently announced will “knockout” or 
disrupt each of the 20,000 protein-coding genes in the mouse genome.114 Mice are 
also important in stem cell research, broadening the utility of the mouse to 
mammalian development and physiology. Recent advances in this field, attributable to 
the mouse, are presented with equal enthusiasm. Smith claims that ‘the faculty for 
propagating pluripotent stem cells from mouse and human embryos’ is a ‘gift from 
nature [that] has provided unparalleled research tools’.115 I noted above, for example, 
that researchers have experimented with injecting human embryonic stem cells into 
mouse brains, providing new models for studying neural development which might 
advance understanding of neurodegenerative and psychiatric diseases. 
 
This enthusiasm and the technical advance of animal models is tempered and 
constrained by legislation in ways that can usefully be explicated by social science. 
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The regulatory and legislative position on animal experimentation seeks to satisfy the 
requirements of industry and science whilst protecting animals from avoidable 
suffering and unnecessary use.116 This inevitably leads to cost-benefit thinking, but 
the UK Animal Procedures Committee, which advises the Home Secretary on matters 
that fall under the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act, points out that cost-benefit 
analyses involve judgements that encode values and are therefore contestable and 
contingent.117 They do not, for example, encode the judgements of those who argue 
for the complete end to animal experimentation in any form. 
 
When grounded ethically, the argument for the end to animal experimentation lacks 
force, in Burkhardt’s terms, in that those involved in the practice of biotechnology 
will never be persuaded; not, that is, until ethics becomes a legitimate and routine part 
of the ‘scientific attitude’.118 This seems to imply that animal scientists don’t have 
ethics, but of course this is not the case. Social scientists are not often directly 
involved in philosophical analysis of ethics, but they certainly are interested in the 
ethical and moral reasoning and activities of those engaged on both sides of 
Burkhardt’s binary: with animal rights activists and with animal scientists.119 Yet to 
report, the Reconfigurations of Human/Animal Relations in Genomics and Beyond 
project at Cesagen, Lancaster University, engages with animal scientists as part of its 
work, exploring how they frame their research and work through moral dilemmas.120 
Similarly, the Use of Animals in Science project based at the Institute for Science and 
Society, University of Nottingham, aims to investigate arguments used by scientists 
and animal activists and whether and how boundaries are drawn between “ethical” 
and “scientific” claims.121 
 
Other social scientific studies, notably at Innogen, University of Edinburgh, have 
begun to investigate the commercial activities of the animal genomics sector, the 
likely socio-economic impacts of new developments, and the international regulatory 
climate for GM and cloned animals.122 The social scientific investigation of 
laboratory animal genomics is then beginning to hit its stride. There remains however 
a tendency to orient to the production of human and institutional practice, agency, 
cognition and so on. But taking a small step from social science toward the history of 
science, there have been projects that have focused on, and sought to account for, the 
construction of the animal in scientif 123ic research.  
 
In Making Mice, Rader considers the construction of standardised laboratory mice.124 
Rader points out that scientists tend to produce a laundry list of material features that 
make the mouse appear without question the most suitable experimental model for 
human disease states. Garanga lists high fertility, genetic tractability, short gestation 
and susceptibility to disease, to which Cox and Brown add numerous genetically well-
defined lines, modest cost and short generation times.125 To this can now also be 
added the many sophisticated technologies for manipulating the mouse genome and 
the availability of the genome sequence.126 Yet, just as with the pig in 
xenotransplantation, Rader contends that these justifications need to be understood as 
the outcome of a historical and sociological process more than the material nature of 
the mouse. This is not to say that high fertility, modest cost and so on are not valid 
reasons for choosing the mouse, but that to speak only in these terms decontextualises 
the mouse and “black-boxes” the places, values, politics and practices that led to its 
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development and use as the experimental model. Rader argues that the very notion of 
a “standardised” laboratory organism required intense negotiation over material, 
organisational and conceptual categories that are now taken for granted: 
 
‘Standardized organisms, therefore, need to be reconceived within a 
broader sociology of technoscientific work. These animals are the 
result, rather than the cause, of consensus among early twentieth-
century experimental biologists’.127 
 
In discussing the various developers, producers and users of the laboratory mouse, 
Rader focuses primarily on the role of individuals, especially the ‘passion and drive’ 
of Clarence Cook Little. Little founded the Jackson Laboratory in the 1920s which is 
now home to around 2800 mouse varieties as breeding mice, frozen embryos or DNA 
samples.128 These inbred mice, and all the others in labs across the world, are an 
allegory of animals under the human gaze. 
  
6. Knowing, relating and looking at animals 
 
The position of animals in the human gaze is ambiguous, and these ambiguities 
function at individual as well as societal and cultural levels. Animals are at times 
considered companions, members of the family even, and significant resources are 
deployed in saving particular species, especially when threatened by human activity. 
At the same time, research that ultimately destroys animals is conducted to better 
human health, and animals are destroyed or exploited for food, clothing and pleasure. 
Rats exemplify ambivalent identity, being loveable pets, detestable pests and 
scientifically ‘neutral’ laboratory animals.129 On an individual level, hobby-farmers 
experience animals as both friends and sources of food, and those working in the meat 
industry need to manage both emotional attachment and detachment to the animals 
with which they work.130 
 
It is tempting here to use the conjunction but not and to better capture the apparent 
paradox in these relationships: to the hobby farmer, animals are friends but also food; 
rats are pets but also killed for research; some species are conserved but others are 
hunted as pests. Berger suggests that our temptation to see but here is a vestige of a 
shift in human-animal relations during the industrial period.131 At that time, a 
previous intimate and proximal relationship where animals were, and meant, man
things (…and…) became one of distance, and some animals and some species were 
reduced to productive units (…but…). Yet following the collapse of modernism and 
the rise of late modernity/post-modernity, Franklin argues that we must return to 
seeing the and: ‘The possibility of consistency in the realm of human-animal 
relations’, writes Franklin, ‘is less likely than differentiations’.
y 
arch 132 Genomic rese
needs to be understood in the context of this inconsistent and ambiguous landscape, 
reinforcing the need to think through and talk about human-animal relationships, 
representations, understandings, practices and so on. 
 
Consider companion animals. Serpell cautions against aligning the companion animal 
genome with a human aesthetic that disregards effects on the animal. Serpell 
particularly targets negative consequences arising from genetic selection, noting that 
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selection for traits that appeal to our anthropomorphic perceptions has led to animals 
with painful or disabling conditions, citing the English Bulldog which suffers physical 
deformities and nasal and respiratory disorders. If the Bulldog had been produced 
through genetic engineering in agriculture, Serpell suggests, then there would be 
public protest, but it has been generated by ‘anthropomorphic selection’ and is 
accepted because it is part of a social, rather than economic or industrial, inter-species 
relationship.133 
 
Serpell’s analysis suggests that if technologies like genetic modification or marker-
assisted selection become tools of the pet trade, then a different reaction might be 
expected than to their use in farming or agriculture.134 But a reaction would be 
elicited only if these practices became common knowledge: breeding in agricultu
has produced Bulldog-like horrors. Selection for production traits has generated 
diseases and disabling deformities in poultry that are not seen in animals that have n





135 and perpetuating the massive double-muscling 
cattle breed Belgian Blue, initially the outcome of a ‘natural’ genetic mutation, 
presents significant welfare problems. For example, 90% of Belgian Blue calves ha
to be delivered by caesarean section and Webster suggests that this runs clos
contravening British law and the Protection of Animals Act. Webster argues that ‘the 
whole [Belgian Blue farming] system depends absolutely on the deliberate production 
of a population of fundamentally unfit breeding animals, lethal recessives in fact’.136 
 
It may be, therefore, that Serpell’s observed lack of public disquiet over such horrors 
is a consequence of the persistent separation in Western culture of the food we eat 
from the means of its production, and that we don’t really “know” our food animals at 
all. 
 
However, the rise of the “welfare consciousness” is leading industry and farm animal 
scientists to consider trade-offs between maximising production whilst at the same 
time attending to welfare concerns, a process in which functional genomics may have 
a role.137 But whether this solution fits with the needs and demands of the perceived 
target group – consumers – is a space for social scientific research. It may be that 
without this research, the technical drive to balance profits and ethics assumes too 
much about the social world to which it believes it is responding, the type of blind 
spot sociologists feel led, in part, to the current unstable position of GM crops and 
food. 
 
Genomics might then be used as a conduit for explicating the varied understandings 
and relationships which we have with animals, but there are more immediate ways 
that current genomic practices and technologies change our understandings of 
animals. For example, by interfering in inherited characteristics, it is sometimes 
claimed that we are changing the animal that is known, what that animal “is”, its 
“natural” form of life, its purposes and ends (“telos”). Whilst “traditional” animal 
farming works with those ends, genomic knowledge and biotechnology means that we 
can manipulate these ends to the point that they are disregarded.138 The extent to 
which this principle is new to biotechnology can be overplayed. Sixty years ago 
Collingwood commented that for a cattle-breeder, an improved form is one better 
suited to that breeder’s interests, and these are not identical to that of the cattle.139 But 
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the projection of animals from genomic science is different. For example, Grasseni 
argues that biotechnology has shaped farmers’ perception of animal nature and their 
practice of animal breeding to fit its patterns.140 From ethnographic research at cattle 
fairs and farms in Italy, Grasseni shows how the ‘science’ of biotechnology has 
completed the industrialisation of animal bodies by shaping the ‘art’ of animal 
breeding and the ‘vision’ of cattle breeders. Standardised practices, expert advice and 
biotechnology now mediate breeders’ more direct knowing of their animals and has 
shifted their concern from ‘longevity’ and ‘sturdiness’ to ‘productivity’ and ‘statistical 
hazard control’. 
 
The central organising principle is that biotechnology and genomics encourages a 
reductionist view of the animal. Michael argues that ‘off the peg’ genetic design 
reduces the animal to the sum of its genes, and the knowing of an animal’s genetic 
make-up becomes enough to comprehensively know that animal.141 For Bowring, this 
breaking up of animals into collections of genes and traits, whose relationship to the 
organism in which they reside is wholly contingent, and then manipulating genetic 
material accordingly, threatens the integrity and autonomy of animals on which the 
human-animal social relationship is based. Bowring argues animal companionship 
points toward the cultural position of animals as providers of ‘aesthetic, affective and 
cognitive nourishment’ in a way that genes clearly cannot, and he argues that a 
farmer’s respect ‘for organisms as organisms’ is threatened by the genetic engineer 
and their laboratory.142 
 
Concluding remarks: Policies in the genomic era 
 
For Franklin, the anthropocentric separation of humans and animals is no longer 
tenable at either the social or theoretical level.143 Through its various forms, genomics 
and associated biotechnologies offer new levels of analysis and new practices for the 
continued revision of the human-animal conceptual coupling, for the meaning of 
humanness, and for the representation of animals. Comparative genomics speaks 
confidently of concepts and tools to quantify the similarity and difference between 
animals where we might previously have seen predominantly qualitative (human–
other) distinctions; stem cell research and cross-species transplantation mix material 
and make indeterminate hybrid beings; mice are bred to express human genetic 
defects and become humans by proxy; animals are reduced to information, genes, 
proteins, etc. temporarily assembled in valuable machines; and so on. For some, these 
are not only conceptual and sociological issues, but policy issues too. 
 
Paula argues that genomics extends discomfort over the use of animals in science and 
food production beyond welfare and the “Three Rs” paradigm (replacement, 
reduction, refinement). Paula suggests that a constellation of intrinsic (eg, tampering 
with nature) and extrinsic (eg, food safety) citizen concerns, coupled with societal 
demands for regulatory transparency and accountability, requires a more open and 
inclusive discussion of animal genomics, which continually moves with technological 
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A challenge for this evolving view of policy is to build mechanisms into decision-
making by which conceptual framings that fall outside the dominant technical 
discourse can at least be entertained and thought through. For example, some 
scientists have been pressing for a ‘whole-animal’ approach to farm animal welfare. 
This treats animals as integrated and experiencing beings, and looks at animals’ 
expressive body language in order to understand the “inside” of their experience. 
Wemelsfelder et al have no hesitation in making theirs an anthropomorphic approach, 
even inviting lay persons to evaluate animal welfare and validate their approach by 
considering how an animal seems to be feeling or reacting.145 Crucially, these people 
are only “lay” in the sense that they are not scientists, not in the sense that they cannot 
understand or know how an animal “feels”. This approach contrasts sharply with the 
currently accepted “scientific” and “objective” assessment of suffering which, for 
example, counts skin lesions or maladaptive behaviours. It also contrasts sharply with 
reductionist visions encouraged by genomics. 
 
But notions of species integrity and telos fall outside current regulatory frameworks, 
and so too do some new scientific animal objects. There are now technologies, 
practices and products that traverse or transcend the boundaries between regulatory 
authorities and their terms of reference.146 For example, there is no specific UK 
regulation with regard to the transplant of human stem cells into animals, but 
depending on the precise procedure and the precise materials, one or more of four 
different agencies might be involved in granting approval (Home Office, Animal 
Procedures Committee, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), 
Stem Cell Bank Steering Committee). Although complicated, at least the regulatory 
procedure is defined. This was not the case when in November 2006 the HFEA 
received two applications for a licence to derive stem cells from ‘human’ embryos 
created from animal eggs instead of human eggs. The embryos would contain animal 
and human DNA, and an HFEA spokesperson commented that ‘we need to decide 
whether the law prohibits this research [and] whether it falls under our remit at all’, 
clearly illustrating the challenge to existing structures posed by novel creatures.147 In 
January 2007, after ‘careful consideration’, the HFEA determined that ‘under current 
legislation, these sorts of research would potentially fall within the remit of the HFEA 
to regulate and license, and would not be prohibited by the legislation’.148 But the 
HFEA decided that the legality of the research alone should not determine the 
granting of any licence. Rather, the HFEA decided to organise a public consultation 
on hybrid and chimera research in order to help determine the best way to proceed.149 
Stephen Minger, head of one team that wants to make the embryos, stated that they 
were ‘happy with [the] decision to consult both public and scientific opinion 
regarding cloning of human cells using non-human eggs’,150 perhaps reflecting the 
new mood for dialogue on science policy issues.151 This is a positive development, 
and I mentioned earlier that animal genomics may be a useful test bed for new ways 
of developing socially sensitive policies, for it is neither so new that its social 
consequences cannot be known or predicted, or so established that it is very resistant 
to change.152 
 
Any new process of policy development would need to be anticipatory and 
reactionary, taking account of developments as they arise. After all, there will always 
be developments that just a few months or years before were not within the regulatory 
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gaze or were considered science fiction, and genomics has one more surprise. For a 
while there has been discussion on the possibility of using cloning techniques to 
resurrect extinct animal life.153 Adding fuel to the discussion, the sequencing of 
Mammoth DNA154 and the finding of the best preserved mammoth yet155 led to 
inevitable media speculation on the possibility of ‘growing’ a woolly mammoth.156 
Discussion continues on whether cloning will allow us to come to “know” extinct 
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